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Abstract 
The literature on capital structure determinants is extensive, so contributing to the field with 
both new variables that authors generally haven’t thought about to a geography that is not 
known as much as the United States and Europe seemed a good idea. The region has many 
specificities, especially at the institutional and macroeconomy level. Results show that the 
coefficients signs of Profitability and Tangibility are the same as the rest of the world, but we 
a higher magnitude. An ambiguity before, inflation indeed negatively affects leverage. Also, 
the more developed the financial environment, the higher the leverage. 
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I. Motivation 
This study is about the determinants of capital structure in Latin America. In order to bring new 
knowledge to the field, this will consist first by testing the previously published results, see if 
they apply for this specific region and add later some variables in order to provide evidence of 
other possible determinants that explain how firms on this region finance their activities, which 
could benefit both academics and practitioners. According to a recent study from law firm 
Baker McKenzie (2018), there are good prospects for the mergers and acquisitions market in 
this region, and by better understanding the capital structure of these firms (and its discount 
rate), a more realistic valuation could be reached. A higher emphasis will be given to the 
institutional environment as it shapes the degree of economic development and growth of 
countries, driving decisions taken by businesses. 
The region is known to be a place of political and economic vulnerability. In order to see if 
there are firm and country characteristics that reflect this context, companies from the six larger 
economies (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru) will be gathered.  
The area is characterized by high inequality and corruption. Examples of economic issues 
include currency volatility, trade uncertainty and lack of infrastructure. Argentina and Brazil 
are members of the MERCOSUR, the main trade bloc in the region, with the other countries 
being somehow partners as well. These economies strongly rely on sectors such as Agriculture, 
Mining and Oil & Gas, being exposed to their commodity price fluctuations. 
II. Theoretical Introduction 
Capital structure is the combination of debt, equity or other hybrid securities which is used to 
finance the daily run businesses. This topic has a long collection of studies that try to find out 
its determinants and how managers decided between the different financing option. 
 
4 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) built the corner stone of capital structure by using plenty of 
perfect and efficient market assumptions. Conclusions: (a) it is irrelevant to use debt or equity; 
(b) the higher the leverage, the higher the return on equity (increased risk premium), even 
though overall firm risk and discount rate keeps the same value. In Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
the existence of taxes is now taken into consideration. As interest payments are tax deductible, 
using debt leads to a higher firm value due to Tax Shield. Also, the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital decreases due to the effect of taxes. Fully financing the firm with debt would be the 
optimal capital structure. 
Some authors (ex: Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)), decided to go further and included 
bankruptcy costs in the model as it should be accounted when calculating the value of the 
levered firm. These costs include hiring lawyers, paying courts and selling assets, among others. 
Agency costs must also be taken in consideration. The cash flows might not be strong enough 
to pay interests plus principal. Managers decide to use debt until its marginal benefits equals its 
marginal costs, reaching an optimal capital structure, as defended in the Static Trade-off 
Theory. Symmetric information and efficient markets still hold here. 
Later, Myers (1984) argues that although the Trade-off approach seems to be “moderate”, as it 
does not show a solid R2. Also, there are transactions and issuing costs which make the constant 
adaptation to a new optimum a hard task. He states that firms have priorities when it comes to 
financing: first, internal funds, then debt issuance (cheaper, riskless and generates a tax shield) 
while also demonstrating discipline in the generation of steady future cash flows, which remind 
us the “Informational Role of Debt”, from Harris and Raviv (1990), and finally equity. The 
Pecking Order Theory says that equity makes the managers share their ownership and signals 
to the outside investor a low confidence toward the firm generating cash flows strong enough 
to pay for debt obligations. 
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Another important theory is the Management Entrenchment Theory, from Zwiebel (1996), in 
which managers use leverage in order to empire-build (i.e. to have more control over the 
decisions of the firm). This way, the capital structure does not have an optimum that is 
shareholder oriented, but rather managerial oriented. By taking excess leverage, managers are 
putting the company and shareholders under higher risk. Studies also point to a theory called 
Market Timing, in which managers do not give that much importance to what type of financing 
that is used, but when it must be done, according to their current valuation on the market. As 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) says: “…capital structure is largely the cumulative outcome of past 
attempts to time the equity market.” 
III. Literature Review 
To start with, Titman and Wessels (1988) differentiates itself from others as it uses short-term, 
long-term and convertible debt measures, instead of aggregate ones. It introduces the topic by 
criticizing the methodology of some researches, stating that some variables are chosen as 
proxies in order to bring better statistical measurements to the studies, as well as saying that 
some independent variables might be related to each other. Some interesting new variables were 
included such as R&D and depreciation. Conclusions include: smaller firms prefer short-term 
leverage, probably due to higher costs of raising long-term capital. 
Another piece of research (Rajan and Zingales (1995)) begins by stating that, even after many 
studies (mostly in the United States), there is a lack of evidence from an empirical point of view 
about the relevance of capital structure. In this case, seeking evidence from other developed 
markets is the main goal of this study. Differences in accounting, legal and institutional 
practices must be taken into consideration to measure leverage and its determinants. The authors 
give special relevance to taxes, bankruptcy codes, market for corporate control, role played by 
banks and securities markets. Even though the author tries to compare the balance sheets and 
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different leverage measures from country to country, this current work will make a more 
standard and simple approach. As a conclusion, the authors find that there is a similar pattern 
of leverage across the G7 countries, and it is hard to compare the effects of institutional 
variables between different countries. The author states that leverage increases with firm 
specific factors such as size, taxes and tangibility, while it decreases with investment 
opportunities and profitability. 
The first relevant paper that looks at non-developed countries is Booth et al. (2001), which 
looks across the globe in order to test if the firm and country-specific variables can be applied 
everywhere. The authors state some difficulties when it comes to using the data and deciding a 
methodology for the analysis, such as the not existence of proxies for important factors and 
different number of observations for different variables. One of the results, similar to the others, 
is that profitability has a negative impact on leverage, which might suggest that the Pecking 
Order Theory is applied here, as there is plenty of agency and information asymmetries in these 
countries. Also, the higher tangibility of assets is once again a factor that increases leverage. 
But the main conclusion of the study is this: while firm specific factors are generally similar 
across the world, country factors differ significantly. 
The paper from Desai et al (2004) seems to be very specific and it gives some interesting 
insights about capital structure. The authors tried to find out how overseas affiliates of 
American firms finance themselves: internally (recurring to the parent company) or externally 
(through the debt and equity markets in which they are inserted)? The main conclusion is that 
“Multinational firms appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome 
imperfections in external capital markets”. The study innovates in this field of knowledge by 
testing new variables such as Creditor Rights and Capital Market Depth. One of the difficulties 
faced was the fact that it is hard to compare financial variables between countries that have 
different accounting procedures. A few results include a positive relation between leverage and 
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interest rates, creditor rights and political risk; negative relations include inflation, profitability 
and capital market depth. 
From all papers chosen, the one from De Jong et al. (2008) seems to be the closer to what will 
be studied in this research. The article says that country-specific factors influence leverage 
directly (capital market conditions) and indirectly (it affects firm-specific factors). The data 
includes almost 12 thousand firms from 42 developing and developed countries over a five-
year period. The authors studied possible firm-specific factors such as size, asset tangibility, 
profitability, firm risk and growth opportunities; for country-specific, it uses legal enforcement, 
shareholder/creditor protection, market/bank-based financial system, stock/bond market 
development and growth rate of the economy. Although their results follow the same pattern as 
the known literature, they noticed that some factors have the opposite effect as expected and a 
few factors differ from country to country. When it comes to country-specific factors, GDP 
growth, bond market development and creditor right protection have high impact on capital 
structure. This result work as a “role model” for advanced economies with strong level of legal 
development (United States and Europe), where firms are more likely to use debt financing. In 
order to compute the leverage of each firm, the authors used a standard approach which consists 
in (Book Value of LT Debt)/(Market Value of Total Assets). They suggest that ST Debt have 
different determinants, leading to a very different end-result. It is mentioned that they used 
dummies for industry groups in order to check for robustness. Regarding the methodology, the 
authors run a regression for firm-specific factors and another for country-specific factors, as 
well as regressions for the country dummies (direct impact) and for country effects on firm 
factors (indirect impact). 
To finish, Fan et al. (2012) focus on the institutional characteristics that influence capital 
structure choice. The main finding is that the institutional environment has a greater influence 
on the financing decisions of the firm than industry characteristics. Corruption and weaker laws 
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lead to a higher degree of leverage and shorter debt horizons. Another interesting insight is that 
the author emphasizes the influence of the suppliers of capital (i.e. investors), which may be 
related to the availability of government debt and level of deposits and savings. Economic 
development is positively related to leverage, as already mentioned above. 
IV. Data 
The study will be based on two main type of variables: Country- and firm-specific data. As told 
before, the countries of our study were chosen because they are the largest economies in the 
region. The sample period is between 2000 and 2017, as data before that was scarce, while 
trying to get the maximum amount of observations as possible. Also, yearly is the chosen 
frequency, as it is easier to find for country data. Data for firm factors were taken from 
Bloomberg. Firms chosen include the ones present in the countries’ main stock indexes (158 in 
total). By mistake, there are 19 firms that are part of the S&P/BVL Peru General Index which 
were not included in the list. By taking the largest firms, we are ignoring possible differences 
in financing options between large and small firms. Financial institutions (banks and insurance 
firms) had to be deleted, as their business model and balance sheet differ significantly from 
firms in other industries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also refer to the fact that these types of 
institutions must follow capital requirements, which affect their capital structure choice. 
Country variables were mostly taken from the World Bank, but also from other sources, which 
will be referenced as the data is described. There are four kind of variables in this study: control 
variables for firm specific factors, control variables for country specific factors, new variables 
for firm specific factors and new variables for country specific factors. Also, we would like to 
refer that all firm variables were “winsorized”. A percentile is chosen (in our case, 0.001), and 
is applied symmetrically to the distribution. Everything that does not lie in between the 0.0005-
0.9995 range, is considered an outlier, and the value of these outliers now assume the value of 
the respective upper or lower percentile. The referred percentile was chosen as it eliminates all 
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the book leverages higher than one, while switching the values for the lost number of 
observations possible. This percentile was applied to all other firm-specific variables for a 
matter of consistency. An alternative technique would be to “trim” the observations, i.e. to 
delete the outliers, but the previously mentioned authors demonstrated that winsorization gives 
us less biased results. Finally, one issue that is a big part of the study of De Jong et al. (2008) 
is that different independent variables have indirect effects on each other, multicollinearity is 
probably one issue on this work. Dependent variables can be seen in the Appendix (Table 1), 
both at country and regional level. Descriptive Statistics on both Dependent and Independent 
variables are on Table 2. 
Dependent Variables 
Before defining our measures of leverage, we must keep in mind that there might be differences 
in accounting measures, what is and is not included in a specific entry (how depreciation is 
taken into account, for example), even if now countries follow a more standardized and 
international practice of accounting. We have no information whether the figures for firm-
specific variables are from consolidated balance sheets (in which a group of firms report all the 
affiliates’ balance sheet in a single one) and we did not pay attention to firms from one country 
being part of the stock market in one country. 
As we all know, book values reflect what accounting says, the historical value while market 
values tell us the valuation given to by the financial market. The differences between one and 
another might transmit what are the evolution of the firm and if it is doing better than what its 
accounting values say. Therefore, leverage rations that base themselves on one or another 
reflect what debt looks like compared to the accounting figures and how debt is doing in 
comparison to the expectations of the market.  
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There are two measures of leverage on this study: Book leverage, which is total debt over total 
book value of assets. Although it is a measure widely used, De Jong et al. (2008) warn us that 
short-debt includes trade credit, whose determinants might be different than for the rest of debt, 
giving us distorted results. Market leverage, which is total debt over market value of assets 
(market value of assets equals book assets less book equity plus market capitalization).  
In Fan et al. (2012), long-term debt over assets is used to measure the “durability” of debt, and 
to distinguish it from short-term debt. These two might be stronger or weaker according to 
different factors and geographies. Besides those, total liabilities over total assets is also used, 
but Rajan and Zingales (1995) clearly state that accounts payable and pension liabilities inflate 
the value of leverage, without being part of the financing strategy of the firm.  
In Table 1 the reader* can see both book and market values of median leverage for the whole 
region (our dependent variables) and for each country that are part of it. As shown, Brazil is the 
country with the highest level of leverage, for both, while Colombia has the lowest book 
leverage and Mexico has the lowest market leverage. The country with the largest difference 
between book and market leverage is Mexico, as well. In De Jong et al. (2008), which measures 
leverage levels by country, the values for market leverage are below ours, as they use Long-
term Debt only instead of Total Debt. Booth et al. (2001), which analyses Brazil and Mexico, 
have higher values for total liabilities over assets and lower values for long term debt over 
assets. Fan et al. (2012), which uses the same measure of market leverage as we do, have higher 
values for Mexico, Brazil and Peru, and more or less the same for Chile; for long-term debt 
over assets, values look even higher than in our case (using total debt). Mexico and Chile engage 
more in long-term debt than Brazil and Chile. Rajan and Zingales (1995) use many forms of 
leverage, including total debt over book assets, the same as one of our measures, and has 
generally the same values for the most countries, except for Japan (lower).  
 
11 
 
Independent Control Variables 
For firm-specific variables, we have tangibility, measured as net fixed assets (or PPE - Property, 
Plant and Equipment) over book value of assets; this factor is generally accepted as having a 
positive impact on leverage, except for Booth et al. (2001); tangible assets serve as a collateral; 
the higher the tangibility, the lower is the risk that the lender is exposed to; also, tangibility 
could serve as an inverse proxy for bankruptcy costs. Profitability, which calculated as EBITDA 
over assets, is accepted as a negative coefficient in all literature; this is in line with the Pecking 
Order Theory: firms first use internal funds to finance themselves, an than look for debt and 
equity; an opposite idea is that, if the firm has strong cash flows, wouldn’t it be better at making 
interest payments (i.e. issuing more debt)? This could be a topic for further research; as a matter 
of curiosity, De Jong et al. (2008) finds out that this coefficient is positive for Chilean firms. 
The logarithm of sales gives us the proxy for firm size; intuitively, the larger the firm, the higher 
its level of diversification, leading to lower probability of bankruptcy, impacting leverage in a 
positive way; besides that, bigger firms are probably more transparent and have steadier 
cashflows, leading to more debt; additionally, De Jong et al. (2008) says “in countries with 
lower [law] enforcement, the role of firm size is a proxy for information asymmetry alleviation 
is further enhanced.”. To finish this paragraph, market-to-book ratio, denoted as growth 
opportunities by some authors, is defined as market over book value of the firm; this way, we 
can see the present perception and future expectations of the market about a certain firm; a 
value higher than one signs overvaluation or potential growth; a negative coefficient is expect, 
according to literature; once again, De Jong et al. (2008) tells us that if there is a perspective of 
growth, shareholders do not want issue debt so that they can channel cashflows to themselves. 
When it comes to country level variables, inflation, associated with uncertainty (GDP deflator) 
is a key one, especially when two of chosen countries, Brazil and Mexico, have a track record 
of hyperinflation; according to previous studies, this variable is either insignificant or gives 
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ambiguous result. As one of the main advantages of issuing debt is the tax shields that could be 
generated, we use statutory (corporate) taxes as one of our variables; according to the theory, 
we expect that higher taxed lead to higher leverage; some authors use the corporate tax rate, 
while others use the effective tax rate from Miller (1977), which is a more accurate way to see 
its real impact on leverage, as it takes into account personal taxes on capital and dividend gains. 
Corruption, as an “illness” to society, certainly plays a role on leverage, as it increases 
uncertainty and make institutions less reliable; the expected coefficient is negative; we took this 
variable from Transparency International, which issues a yearly report of its Corruption 
Perception Index. Domestic savings measures the availability of funds from investors, so that 
it could be invested in financial assets, as stated by Fan et al. (2012); the same author finds that 
it is negative for developing countries. Market cap of listed companies shows us the degree of 
the equity market, which negatively correlates with debt on Booth et al. (2001). GDP growth 
could signal where we are in the business cycle (when equity issues increase), but also signals 
good prospects for the economy and good cash flows, which could be used to make interest 
payments; this is a positive contribution to leverage, according to the same author as before. 
The last of this section, rule of law, should have a positive coefficient, as stronger law means 
more transparency, less corruption and a working judicial system (important for bankruptcy 
cases); this variable was taken from the World Governance Indicator, issued by the World Bank, 
and rule of law is one of the variables available; as stated in the report: “Reflects perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence.”; all the rational behind the variables is on Kaufmann 
et al. (2010). 
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Independent (New) Variables 
Now talking about new variables in order to test other eventual capital structure determinants, 
first for firm: one of the variables of our choice is the dividend payout ratio; this variable is 
inspired in the so called Dividend Signaling; it says that when a firm unexpectedly announces 
a dividend increase (decrease), future expectations regarding profitability are increased 
(decreased); although it is not 100% proved as theory (with many caveats), it is defended by 
many authors according to Bernheim and Wantz (1992); we expect it be positive correlated to 
leverage, as both dividend increase and leverage impose a stronger discipline on managers. We 
thought of another variable called effective interest rate, which is essentially all the interest 
payments divided by EBIT; this could show how much the spent in interest correlates with 
leverage, as the interest on debt payments is just one of the spending components of our 
variable; also, this explicits the true interest that the firm faces, and not the one established by 
the central bank (which will show in the next paragraph). The last firm variable in the effective 
tax rate (total tax spending over EBT), which once again seem to be a value for taxation closer 
to the reality of the firm, and not the one stablished on a country level; a positive relation is 
expected; De Jong et al. (2008) uses this measure instead of the standard one for Taxes, as gets 
a negative coefficient; let us test this to see the real sign. 
For possible country variables that could further explain leverage we chose central government 
debt, as the working paper from Demirci et al. (2018) states that there is a negative relation 
between this and leverage; as the government issues debt, investors might seek these securities 
(as they are safer), and (big) firms may think about increase its amount of equity. Another 
variable is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which we expect to have a positive coefficient; 
FDI enhances growth on developing countries (Alfaro et al. (2004)), which could lead a safer 
environment where issuing debt seems a good option. As suggested by Booth et al. (2001), the 
volume of equity transactions demonstrates the level of development of the equity market 
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(therefore, imposing an opposite effect on leverage), so we use the value of all stocks traded 
over GDP as another variable. As a key macroeconomic indicator in any economy, the level of 
interest rate established by the central bank (without inflation) sets the standard for the interest 
on any financial activity (lending, borrowing, …), so we expect negative value here. Probably, 
the most interesting variable of this paper is the one called “Financial Develop Index”; it was 
developed by the International Monetary Fund (Svirydzenka (2016)), it takes into account the 
depth, access and efficiency of both the Financial Markets and Financial Institutions of a 
country; as the reader might suspect, this might be positive correlated with leverage; as a 
problem it must be certainly correlated to other variables that we wrote above (transaction on 
the equity market, for example). It is known from International Trade classes that the surplus 
in an economy increase with the level of openness, and that is why Trade (Exports plus Imports, 
divided by GDP) is another variable of that might generate a positive coefficient; the literature 
on this is extensive, with one example being David and Loewy (1998). The last country variable 
to be mentioned is the “Government Effectiveness”, also part of the World Bank study 
“Worldwide Governance Indicators”; as it describes the variable “Reflects perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.”; once again, a positive correlation 
is expected; this variable kind of translates the same as the one from the IMF, but orientated to 
the public sector in general, instead of the financial institutions.  
V. Methodology 
As mentioned before, the first step towards treating the data was the winsorization of variables. 
The correlation between all the variables are presented in the Appendix (Tables 3.1-3.6), as it 
serves as a first step towards finding out whether our predictions are right. The next three 
paragraphs make use of these tables. 
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Regarding the control variables and book leverage, the ones that contradict the predictions 
stated on the Data section of this paper are market-to-book, corruption and GDP growth. The 
logarithm of sales (i.e. Size) and market capitalization of the listed companies are essentially 
zero. Inflation, which was the ambiguous variable, exhibits a positive behavior towards book 
leverage. All the others are according expectations. Now for control variables and market 
leverage, market-to-book is now in line with expectations, and corruption, inflation and 
economic growth keep the same signs as for book leverage. All else is remain the same. 
Magnitudes now seem to be a bit “far away” from zero. 
Let us analyze the new variables in comparison to book leverage. Effective tax rate is negative. 
Central government debt, volume of stocks traded, and real interest rate are positive, going 
against what was previously thought. Trade has a negative correlation with book leverage. 
Government effectiveness is essentially zero. Everything else matches expectations. To finish, 
for the new variables and market leverage, real interest rate is now negative, while all the rest 
is similar to correlations with book leverage.  
As a matter of curiosity, we can look at correlations between independent variables, especially 
between firm and country variables, which might translate indirect effects of these variables on 
leverage, being these one of the main contributions of De Jong et al. (2008). Unfortunately, the 
correlations presented do not seem to be consistent with his work. For example, rule of law is 
positive in relation to size (not expected), while corruption has a negative impact on profitability 
(expected). These results could motivate academics to research it in a deeper and methodical 
way. 
The regression analysis of this paper heavily relies on two mentioned papers: Booth et al. (2001) 
and Fan et al. (2012). First, all the regressions presented were clustered at the firm-level in order 
to obtain unbiased estimates. This means that standard errors at the firm-level were treated in 
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order to obtain variables that are homoscedastic (i.e. do not have variation in errors) and do not 
have serial correlation (i.e. error terms are not correlated over time), which could be considered 
a way to get robust standard errors on a panel data model. This cluster was done through the 
“White cross-sectional” option in “Coefficient covariance method” available on EViews. 
There are three methods of regressions used in this study: Pooled OLS, Period Fixed Effect, 
and Period and Cross-Sectional Fixed Effect. These were used for four different group of 
independent variables: Control Firm variables (1), Control Country variables (2), Control Firm 
and Country variables (3), and Control and New with Firm and Country variables (4). As the 
reader can perceive, the goal of the first three is to test the existing evidence for our aggregate 
sample of Latin American firms according to the respective variables, and the last one is 
intended to add new significant variables to the existing literature. All these were regressed 
against two dependent variables already mentioned in the Data: Book Leverage and Market 
Leverage. Twenty-four regressions in total. 
Focusing on the regression methods. As a first step, Pooled OLS was used to estimate the above-
mentioned models, due to its “simplicity”. This is an OLS model adapted to panel data. Here, 
any specific effect either from firm or period level are ignored. There are two regression 
intercepts for panel data models: one for cross sectional and one for period. In this first case, 
both are fixed. As the data in unbalanced (missing observations), this method does not generate 
the most “efficient or unbiased parameter estimates” (Booth et al. (2001)). 
The second and third methods used to model the determinants of capital structure in Latin 
America are the so-called Fixed Effect models. These allow to either one or both intercepts to 
vary. In other words, we are “freezing” the effect of the Period, so that the changes in leverage 
are captured by the variation of the cross-sectional variables, independently of the time that we 
are analyzing. In the third model, the reader can find regressions fixed at both Period and Cross-
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Sections, promoting coefficients that translate the aggregate effects of the independent variables 
on leverage, ignoring the individual characteristics of firms and time period chosen. 
VI. Results 
The tables can be found in the Appendix section. Significance at the 10% level will be 
considered. The coefficients are on the right of the name of the variable, while the p-values for 
the respective value is below the coefficient. Non-significant p-values in red color.  
Pooled OLS Regressions (Table 4): For regressions (1), which uses Control variables at the 
firm level, the best comparison might be with Ranjan and Zingales (1995), as they use the exact 
same variables. Size is not significant for both Book Leverage and Market Leverage. 
Tangibility and profitability follow the literature, with higher magnitudes in relation to Market 
Leverage; Adjusted R² is way higher for Market Leverage (24%), which is also in line with the 
mentioned paper. Market-to-book is more in line with the literature for market values of 
leverage. For regressions (2), Taxes and Corruption are not significant, and GDP growth is not 
significant for Market Leverage. Inflation contributes negatively to the models and Savings 
show vigorous negative coefficients. Except for GDP growth, all the variables followed what 
were expected. Adjusted R² here is lower than the one from Booth et al. (2001), which uses 
only macroeconomic variables. For regressions (3), using Control variables for both Firm and 
Country level, we do not reject the null for the same variables (Tax, Corruption and GDP growth 
(market leverage case)). Size is now significant, following the literature. Market-to-book is 
once again ambiguous. All the other variables are in line with expectations and the previous 
two cases. Let us test the “big model” (4), the one with both Control and New variables at firm 
and country level. Many variables that were used as control are now not significant (Rule of 
Law, GDP growth, Savings, Corruption and Inflation (Book case). Market-to-book is, for the 
third time, positive (book case) and negative (market case). Taxes have negative coefficients, 
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Inflation now has a positive effect. Regarding the new variables, Dividend payout ratio, 
Effective Interest Rate and Volume of stocks traded have a negative coefficient. Effective Tax 
Rate, Real Interest Rate and Financial Develop Index contribute positively to the both measures 
of leverage. For Foreign Direct Investment, Central Government Debt, Trade and Government 
Effectiveness the null is not rejected, making these not significant variables. Both Adjusted R² 
demonstrate to be the highest of all the four models, even passing the ones from the literature. 
Regressions with Year-Fixed Effect (Table 5): the ones in (1) look similar to the pooled case. 
Regression with (2) variables have insignificant values for Taxes, Corruption (market level) 
and Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (book level). Inflation and GDP growth have 
negative coefficients, while all the others seem to be in line with expectations. Corruption has 
a negative sign in the Book leverage regression. Regressions (3) have generally the same results 
as the regressions (1) and (2).  For the regressions of (4), all the Control firm values are 
significant, and the only case that is not in line with expectations is, once again, the market-to-
book ratio. Taxes, GDP growth, rule of law and corruption are not significant. Inflation is 
positive, similar to the pooled regressions. Central Government Debt and Trade are now 
significant, with the first following the literature results (negative coefficient). Volume of 
stocks traded in not significant now. Adjusted R² are slightly higher for this Year-Fixed Effect 
case, with still a big difference between the cases with book and market leverage.  
Regressions with Year- and Firm-Fixed Effects (Table 6): there are more non-rejected null 
hypothesis. Regressions (1) reveal the same results as before, except for the non-significance 
of market-to-book ratio in the book leverage model. For (2), corruption is now significant with 
a negative sign, savings are also not significant; it is, in fact, the only significant variable of the 
book leverage case. Regressions in (3) have the same results for corruption as in (2). The firm 
and country variables have, respectively, the essentially the same output as the regressions of 
(1) and (2). Regressions for (4), inflation has a positive impact on leverage, Market 
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Capitalization of firms is negative. Taxes, as in the pooled regressions, are significant and have 
a negative coefficient. From all the new variables suggested, the only two significant are the 
Financial Development Index and the Effective Interest Rate. Adjusted R² seem to be inflated 
in this third round of regressions. 
VII. Analysis of the Results 
First, let us compare the control tests with the existing literature. Profitability and Tangibility 
are always significant, in all cases, and coefficients are generally higher than the ones from Fan 
et al. (2012). Size is also significant in most of times, but coefficients are very low, similar to 
the previous paper. Market-to-book ratio is always positive for book leverage, and negative for 
market-leverage (in line with the literature); this difference could be a target for future research. 
Taxes are mostly non-significant; this may be due to the fact that it has the lowest number of 
observations compared to the other variables. Inflation is always negative; its coefficient is in 
line with the values for the developing economies in Fan et al. (2012), which in turn are higher 
than for the developed economies. Corruption is generally not a significant value; when it is 
(mostly the two effects), it is negative, which is the expected sign. Gross savings, when 
significant, are negative, with the magnitude of the coefficients being enormously higher than 
the one from the cited paper. Market capitalization of firms in relation over GDP follow the 
predictions. The first case of a solid results that is against expectations is the one for GDP 
growth, which has a negative sign (but the magnitudes are less than half), contradicting Booth 
et al. (2012); is it because there is higher volatility in these countries, so managers expect a 
recession in the near future, even if today the economy is thriving? Once again, this could be a 
topic for further investigation. We based our predictions for the coefficient for the Rule of Law 
used in De Jong et al. (2008) and, even though we use it as any other variable in our regressions 
(but it is viewed by those authors as having an indirect impact on leverage) we reached a 
positive sign as well.  
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Now turning the attention of the reader to the variables that can potentially influence leverage 
in Latin America. When running regressions for type of variables (4), results seem strange. 
Some Control variables that were significant are not now (and vice-versa), and even flipping 
the sign for inflation, especially for the pooled OLS regressions. Dividend Payout Ratio are 
significant, although they have a low magnitude; coefficient is negative, which contradicts our 
intuition, and only next studies can find out the cause of this. Effective interest rates have zero 
as p-value; but how much from that interest comes only from debt, and not from other sources 
(trade credit, interest from installments of real estate)? This variable should had been studied 
more carefully before being applied to the model, so that the coefficient could actually tell us 
something new. The case for Effective Tax Rate is similar: how much of that debt comes from 
debt, and not from taxes on products sold? As it has a positive sign, it would be in line with our 
expectations for Statutory Corporate Taxes, or effective taxes (used in other papers); De Jong 
et al. (2008) uses this measure for taxes, and his results are (mostly) not in line with ours and 
from other literature. The Year-Fixed Effect regressions for variables (4) lead us to a significant 
and negative coefficient for central government debt, confirming the study from Demirci et al. 
(2016). FDI in never a significant explanatory variable. The volume of stocks traded over GDP 
is only significant for pooled OLS case and is a negative contribution to leverage, as predicted 
(when investors “seek” the equity market, the debt one is less relevant). Real Interest Rate has 
a positive effect on leverage, and the reason is possibly because when the economy is doing 
good, central bankers raise interest rates (and vice-versa), but borrowing becomes more 
expensive as well, which is clearly a case of ambiguity. The Financial Development Index from 
the IMF not just have significant coefficients in all regressions, but also considerable 
magnitudes; as this variable gathers financial market financial institutions information, it could 
alone be a proxy for many variables that are both control and new; so, as the financial 
environment develops in the region, more managers will want to issue debt. In half of the 
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regressions trade is not significant, and on others it contributes negatively to debt; contrary to 
the initial rationing, openness of the economy might lead to investors and firm to use more the 
equity market. Government effectiveness does not generate results. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Although this region has a specific institutional and business environment compared to the rest 
of the world and, especially, the developed world, the determinants of capital structure does not 
vary abruptly. From the control variables used, either on the firm or country side (or both), the 
results are similar. We found out that Tangibility, Profitability and Savings not only are in line 
with previous studies at the sign level, but the magnitude of the coefficients are considerably 
higher, being these a differential in relation to other geographies. We can say that inflation does 
influence the leverage of Latin American firms in a positive way. Further research lies on 
market-to-book ratio (ambiguity) and GDP growth (opposite sign). 
New variables seem to arise as possible determinants of capital structure in the region. On the 
macroeconomic level, real interest rates (even if ambiguous) and volume of traded stocks 
(demand of equity from investors). On the institutional side, the Financial Development Index 
produced by the IMF seems to be a good representative of many factors, and confirming the 
prediction that financial development lead to higher leverage. 
In order to have better results in the future, compared to this paper, the winsorization should be 
made at the 1% level and multicollinearity must be analyzed, as it certainly influenced the 
coefficients, overestimating them. Also, we could had found relevant effects of corporate taxes, 
but the number of observations was lower than the other variables. Comparing the different 
types of rejections made, the Year-Fixed Effects seems to be “better”, as it ignores the time 
component that might be attached to the leverage levels and independent variables, while not 
rejecting that many p-values as the regressions with both Fixed Effects (not forgetting the 
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“inflated” R²), and it also gives higher R² compared to pooled OLS regressions. Besides that, 
the literature that we based this study on prefer Fixed Effects at one level only. 
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X. Appendix 
Table 1 – Leverage by country 
  
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
Argentina 0,31 0,27 0,27 0,19 0,21 0,22 
Brazil 0,33 0,26 0,32 0,24 0,15 0,15 
Chile 0,30 0,24 0,30 0,22 0,10 0,13 
Colombia 0,24 0,23 0,24 0,23 0,14 0,14 
Mexico 0,25 0,18 0,25 0,15 0,14 0,13 
Peru 0,26 0,21 0,27 0,18 0,14 0,17 
Region 0,29 0,24 0,29 0,21 0,15 0,16 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Observations 
Book Leverage 0,29 0,29 1,00 0,00 2381 
Market Leverage 0,24 0,21 0,90 0,00 2217 
Tangibility 0,41 0,41 0,94 0,00 2441 
Profitability 0,14 0,13 1,06 -0,28 2414 
Size 7,44 7,45 11,89 -0,09 2428 
Market-to-book 2,51 1,73 50,04 -8,09 2265 
Tax 0,30 0,33 0,40 0,17 1385 
Inflation 0,07 0,06 0,40 -0,01 2844 
Corruption 4,14 3,70 7,50 2,50 2844 
Savings 0,19 0,18 0,25 0,12 2844 
Market Caps 0,49 0,41 1,56 0,06 2769 
GDP growth 0,03 0,03 0,10 -0,11 2844 
Rule of Law -0,14 -0,36 1,43 -0,89 2686 
Dividend 0,66 0,38 78,25 0,00 1814 
Eff Interest 2,13 0,08 827,77 -0,03 2310 
Eff Tax 0,56 0,28 136,46 0,00 2372 
Gov Debt 0,43 0,38 1,52 0,04 2686 
FDI 0,04 0,03 0,11 0,01 2844 
Stocks Traded 0,14 0,10 0,46 0,00 2844 
Real Interest 0,17 0,10 0,48 -0,11 2724 
Fin Dev Index 0,42 0,41 0,61 0,20 2686 
Trade 0,42 0,37 0,81 0,22 2844 
Gov Effectiv 0,11 -0,05 1,28 -0,67 2686 
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Table 3.1 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrix Book Leverage Market Leverage Tangibility Profit Size 
Book Leverage 1,0000         
Market Leverage 0,7572 1,0000       
Tangibility 0,1262 0,2151 1,0000     
Profit -0,1641 -0,3773 0,0429 1,0000   
Size 0,0002 0,0270 0,0278 0,0193 1,0000 
Market-to-book 0,0349 -0,3314 -0,1393 0,3277 -0,0086 
Tax 0,0360 0,0175 -0,1958 0,0696 0,0582 
Inflation 0,0322 0,0361 0,0645 -0,0057 -0,0668 
Corruption 0,0362 0,0437 0,1278 -0,1522 0,0119 
Gross Savings -0,1306 -0,2046 0,0997 0,0911 0,0061 
Market Caps -0,0060 -0,1049 0,0267 -0,0974 0,0812 
GDP growth -0,0883 -0,1420 0,0554 0,1246 -0,0875 
Rule of Law 0,0574 0,0529 0,0928 -0,1658 0,0822 
Dividend 0,0082 0,0287 0,0348 -0,0029 0,0146 
Eff Interest -0,0712 -0,0466 -0,0836 0,0244 -0,0590 
Eff Tax -0,0064 -0,0115 0,0476 -0,0429 -0,0397 
Gov Debt 0,1869 0,1835 -0,1065 0,0362 -0,0182 
FDI 0,0105 0,0174 0,0562 -0,0757 0,0686 
Stocks Traded 0,0990 -0,0120 -0,2392 -0,0604 0,2814 
Real Interest 0,1489 0,1472 -0,1517 0,0479 0,0443 
Fin Develop Index 0,1450 0,0469 -0,2144 -0,1115 0,3457 
Trade -0,1108 -0,1540 0,1593 0,0263 -0,0233 
Gov Effectiv 0,0071 -0,0045 0,1593 -0,1324 0,0545 
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Table 3.2 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrix Market-to-book Tax Inflation Corruption Gross Savings 
Book Leverage           
Market Leverage           
Tangibility           
Profit           
Size           
Market-to-book 1,0000         
Tax 0,1085 1,0000       
Inflation 0,0548 0,3825 1,0000     
Corruption -0,0730 -0,7661 -0,2170 1,0000   
Gross Savings -0,0068 -0,6264 -0,2965 0,3053 1,0000 
Market Caps 0,0511 -0,7047 -0,2879 0,7462 0,3825 
GDP growth 0,0196 -0,1747 -0,1340 0,0606 0,3478 
Rule of Law -0,0566 -0,7234 -0,2204 0,9632 0,2781 
Dividend -0,0173 0,0463 0,0428 -0,0333 -0,0429 
Eff Interest 0,0283 0,0136 -0,0139 -0,0249 0,0475 
Eff Tax 0,0136 0,0557 0,1470 -0,0368 -0,0342 
Gov Debt 0,0513 0,7997 0,3667 -0,4995 -0,5979 
FDI -0,0721 -0,7254 -0,3500 0,7225 0,3367 
Stocks Traded 0,1495 0,2765 -0,1013 0,0914 -0,2143 
Real Interest 0,0572 0,4796 -0,1486 -0,1864 -0,6186 
Fin Develop Index 0,1086 0,1316 -0,0685 0,2822 -0,0994 
Trade -0,0461 -0,7292 -0,2961 0,4636 0,8290 
Gov Effectiv -0,0701 -0,8673 -0,1535 0,8728 0,4511 
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Table 3.3 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrix Market Caps GDP growth Rule of Law Dividend Eff Interest 
Book Leverage           
Market Leverage           
Tangibility           
Profit           
Size           
Market-to-book           
Tax           
Inflation           
Corruption           
Gross Savings           
Market Caps 1,0000         
GDP growth 0,2390 1,0000       
Rule of Law 0,7767 0,0370 1,0000     
Dividend -0,0498 -0,0337 -0,0408 1,0000   
Eff Interest -0,0190 -0,0127 -0,0226 -0,0043 1,0000 
Eff Tax -0,0693 -0,0204 -0,0477 0,1371 -0,0029 
Gov Debt -0,3675 -0,1893 -0,4301 0,0398 -0,0095 
FDI 0,5948 0,1812 0,7243 -0,0403 -0,0359 
Stocks Traded 0,4192 -0,0470 0,2336 0,0003 0,0040 
Real Interest -0,0640 -0,1275 -0,1514 0,0005 -0,0268 
Fin Develop Index 0,4500 -0,1367 0,4403 -0,0087 0,0125 
Trade 0,3639 0,1874 0,4181 -0,0500 0,0190 
Gov Effective 0,6616 0,0511 0,8879 -0,0454 -7,8572 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 3.4 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrix Eff Tax Gov Debt FDI Stocks Traded 
Book Leverage         
Market Leverage         
Tangibility         
Profit         
Size         
Market-to-book         
Tax         
Inflation         
Corruption         
Gross Savings         
Market Caps         
GDP growth         
Rule of Law         
Dividend         
Eff Interest         
Eff Tax 1,0000       
Gov Debt -0,0004 1,0000     
FDI -0,0462 -0,4817 1,0000   
Stocks Traded -0,0563 0,3276 0,0749 1,0000 
Real Interest -0,0664 0,6366 -0,1334 0,5363 
Fin Develop Index -0,0519 0,2408 0,2370 0,8754 
Trade -0,0313 -0,7484 0,4510 -0,3830 
Gov Effectiv -0,0351 -0,5472 0,6258 -0,0168 
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Table 3.5 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrix Real Interest Fin Develop Index Trade Gov Eff 
Book Leverage         
Market Leverage         
Tangibility         
Profit         
Size         
Market-to-book         
Tax         
Inflation         
Corruption         
Gross Savings         
Market Caps         
GDP growth         
Rule of Law         
Dividend         
Eff Interest         
Eff Tax         
Gov Debt         
FDI         
Stocks Traded         
Real Interest 1,0000       
Fin Develop Index 0,4052 1,0000     
Trade -0,6862 -0,2475 1,0000   
Gov Effectiv -0,3889 0,2191 0,6479 1,0000 
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Table 4 – Pooled OLS (coefficients on the right of variable, p-value below coefficient) 
 
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Tangibility 0,0960 0,1423 0,0997 0,0994 0,1341 0,1133
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Profitability -0,3914 -0,6223 -0,3179 -0,6322 -0,4346 -0,6659
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Size 0,0030 0,0040 0,0074 0,0185 0,0051 0,0162
0,2003 0,3114 0,0000 0,0000 0,0095 0,0000
Market-to-
book
0,0056 -0,0102 0,0076 -0,0050 0,0184 -0,0032
0,0000 0,0001 0,0000 0,0035 0,0000 0,0214
Tax 0,0819 -0,2172 0,1955 -0,0297 -0,4792 -0,4784
0,7034 0,3700 0,3638 0,9057 0,0107 0,0281
Inflation -0,2823 -0,3759 -0,3610 -0,3255 0,0857 0,2115
0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,1915 0,0038
Corruption -0,0133 -0,0110 -0,0106 0,0001 -0,0035 -0,0052
0,1842 0,3652 0,2726 0,9924 0,7538 0,6975
Savings -0,7166 -1,0416 -0,5800 -0,7661 -0,2036 -0,0032
0,0009 0,0001 0,0149 0,0030 0,3521 0,9873
Market Caps -0,0682 -0,1600 -0,0878 -0,1509 -0,0773 -0,1117
0,0047 0,0000 0,0033 0,0000 0,0122 0,0026
GDP Growth -0,2894 -0,1899 -0,2536 -0,0760 -0,0496 0,0574
0,0298 0,1174 0,0806 0,4883 0,6702 0,6358
Rule of Law 0,0780 0,0975 0,0765 0,0617 -0,0007 0,0300
0,0002 0,0002 0,0001 0,0085 0,9754 0,3444
Dividend -0,0032 -0,0028
0,0189 0,0265
Eff Interest -0,5461 -0,3614
0,0000 0,0000
Eff Tax 0,0350 0,0343
0,0051 0,0019
Gov Debt 0,0211 -0,0765
0,8059 0,3700
FDI -0,1253 -0,3648
0,3131 0,1138
Stocks Traded -0,2676 -0,3726
0,0074 0,0000
Real Interest 0,2196 0,3525
0,0001 0,0000
Fin Dev Index 0,5708 0,5696
0,0000 0,0000
Trade 0,0517 0,0076
0,1753 0,8348
Gov Eff -0,0003 -0,0229
0,9920 0,4236
Adjusted R2 0,0591 0,2399 0,0544 0,1071 0,1220 0,3489 0,1429 0,4267
Observations 2184 2184 1360 1314 1297 1297 856 856
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 5 – Year-Fixed Effects (coefficients on the right of variable, p-value below coefficient) 
 
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Tangibility 0,0954 0,1240 0,1043 0,0994 0,1398 0,1171
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Profitability -0,3875 -0,6537 -0,3128 -0,6322 -0,4231 -0,6699
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Size 0,0036 0,0085 0,0069 0,0185 0,0053 0,0165
0,1215 0,0079 0,0000 0,0000 0,0058 0,0000
Market-to-
book
0,0064 -0,0078 0,0074 -0,0050 0,0182 -0,0031
0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 0,0035 0,0000 0,0298
Tax 0,2456 -0,2125 0,3181 -0,0297 -0,3097 -0,2322
0,3504 0,5075 0,2560 0,9057 0,1403 0,3378
Inflation -0,2107 -0,3696 -0,3029 -0,3255 0,1747 0,2314
0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0309 0,0025
Corruption -0,0246 -0,0080 -0,0202 0,0001 -0,0102 -0,0017
0,0589 0,6624 0,1432 0,9924 0,4262 0,8815
Savings -0,4621 -1,0487 -0,4055 -0,7661 0,3307 0,5542
0,0774 0,0010 0,1653 0,0030 0,1256 0,0280
Market Caps 0,0036 -0,1039 -0,0029 -0,1509 -0,0569 -0,0857
0,8353 0,0120 0,8817 0,0000 0,0478 0,0064
GDP Growth -0,3883 -0,4820 -0,4846 -0,0760 -0,0758 0,0493
0,0037 0,0126 0,0022 0,4883 0,4371 0,6522
Rule of Law 0,0816 0,0707 0,0699 0,0617 -0,0130 0,0022
0,0014 0,0542 0,0091 0,0085 0,6391 0,9195
Dividend -0,0033 -0,0029
0,0183 0,0249
Eff Interest -0,5363 -0,3519
0,0000 0,0000
Eff Tax 0,0336 0,0326
0,0093 0,0040
Gov Debt -0,1597 -0,2134
0,0745 0,0256
FDI 0,0493 -0,1052
0,8362 0,7148
Stocks Traded -0,0588 -0,1601
0,5313 0,1025
Real Interest 0,2463 0,3107
0,0000 0,0000
Fin Dev Index 0,4668 0,4581
0,0002 0,0031
Trade -0,0887 -0,1472
0,0313 0,0007
Gov Eff 0,0098 -0,0123
0,7446 0,5763
Adjusted R2 0,073765 0,30043 0,0713 0,1087 0,1177 0,3433 0,2825 0,4286
Observations 2184 2184 1360 1314 1297 1297 856 856
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 6 - Year- and Firm-Fixed Effects (coefficients on the right of variable, p-value below 
coefficient) 
 
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Tangibility 0,0482 0,1301 0,0827 0,1132 0,1024 0,1594
0,0822 0,0010 0,0041 0,0019 0,0009 0,0019
Profitability -0,3768 -0,5343 -0,3506 -0,5005 -0,4121 -0,5618
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Size 0,0361 0,0326 0,0302 0,0172 0,0520 0,0237
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0032 0,0000 0,0395
Market-to-
book
0,0017 -0,0088 0,0031 -0,0052 0,0090 -0,0079
0,1576 0,0000 0,0000 0,0005 0,0000 0,0000
Tax -0,2951 -0,3517 -0,2652 -0,2841 -0,3918 -0,4668
0,2034 0,1341 0,2071 0,1580 0,0015 0,0114
Inflation -0,0530 0,0256 -0,0881 0,1251 0,2456 0,2598
0,7995 0,7995 0,6492 0,0529 0,0079 0,0010
Corruption -0,0347 -0,0438 -0,0297 -0,0311 -0,0070 -0,0168
0,0896 0,0000 0,0895 0,0015 0,5572 0,2699
Savings 0,0405 0,1521 0,1249 0,0384 -0,1992 -0,0632
0,8883 0,5251 0,6959 0,8680 0,2764 0,7152
Market Caps -0,0359 -0,1558 -0,0312 -0,1382 -0,0057 -0,0843
0,2430 0,0000 0,2833 0,0000 0,9010 0,0545
GDP Growth -0,1378 -0,4114 -0,1846 -0,3260 0,0246 -0,0162
0,3452 0,0000 0,1577 0,0000 0,8694 0,9004
Rule of Law 0,0202 0,0309 -0,0125 0,0434 0,0218 0,0512
0,5341 0,1181 0,7194 0,0000 0,5949 0,0513
Dividend -0,0006 -0,0006
0,4422 0,4676
Eff Interest -0,3394 -0,1488
0,0000 0,0162
Eff Tax -0,0014 0,0039
0,8631 0,6356
Gov Debt 0,0263 0,0493
0,7608 0,6707
FDI -0,2484 -0,1443
0,4036 0,5473
Stocks Traded -0,1346 -0,1288
0,2761 0,1944
Real Interest 0,1591 0,0923
0,1369 0,0483
Fin Dev Index 0,4838 0,3970
0,0003 0,0126
Trade -0,0030 -0,1000
0,9701 0,0658
Gov Eff -0,0450 -0,0514
0,1969 0,1446
Adjusted R2 0,5828 0,6620 0,7150 0,7429 0,7345 0,8012 0,8294 0,8215
Observations 2184 2184 1360 1314 1297 1297 856 856
(1) (2) (3) (4)
